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INTERGENERATIONALISM AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ira C Lupu*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw. By Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman,
Cass R. Sunstein, and Mark V. Tushnet. Boston: Little Brown & Co.
1986. Pp. lxxxi, 1536. $38.95.
COMMENTS - QUESTIONS. By
William B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, Jesse H. Choper, and Steven H.
Shiffrin. ·St. Paul: West Publishing Co. Sixth Edition, 1986. Pp. cxv,
1601. $38.95.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES -

The transmission of ideas from one generation to the next is vital
to the maintenance of culture. The social importance of continuity in
the law suggests that legal culture, including its constitutional law subculture, is especially dependent upon such transmission processes.
For the typical lay person, superficial study of constitutional history in high school and/or college, augmented by journalistic accounts
of Supreme Court decisions, probably is the source of most knowledge
of that subculture. For lawyers, however, the process of acquiring
constitutional knowledge is far more intense and complicated. Even
the lawyer who does no more than take a single course in the subject
in law school is exposed directly to the thinking of her instructor and,
more subtly, to the view of the subject put forward by the authors of
her casebook. In their selection and editing of cases, organization and
structure of chapters, and inclusion of notes, questions, and other secondary material, casebook authors exert a significant influence over
the way a legal subject is taught and learned. Both classroom teachers and casebook authors, in turn, have been shaped and influenced by
a wide variety of sources - their own teachers, the literature in the
field, judges for whom they've clerked, colleagues with whom they
have consulted, and many others. Those sources themselves have similarly been influenced by forces further removed from the present; the
network extends backward and forward in time in a web more seamless than the law itself.
The process thereby described is of course no simple retelling of
tales. Each generation has its own political crises and other consciousness-shaping events. Overlapping with such experiences are intellec-

* Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B. 1968, Cornell University; J.D. 1971, Harvard
University. - Ed. Thanks to Nancy J. Altman, Pnina Lahav, and Avi Soifer for generous and
helpful comments on an earlier version of this review.
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tual trends, social rearrangements, and, for those in the constitutional
law subculture, landmark legal events. Each generation thus receives
and reinterprets its culture's past in light of its own felt needs and
experiences.
The invitation to write a comparative review essay on these two
recent, and very fine, casebooks, presents an opportunity to reflect on
this process. The generational gap between the two sets of authors
suggests that these books in particular are prime candidates for such a
comparison. Three of the four authors of the Stone casebook Professors Seidman, Stone, and Tushnet - graduated from law school
in 1971; 1 the fourth, Professor Sunstein, graduated in 1978. By contrast, Dean Lockhart earned one law degree in the early 1930s and
another in the early 1940s; Professor Kamisar and Dean Choper completed law school in 1954 and 1960, respectively. Professor Shiffrin,
the recently added co-author to the sixth edition of the Lockhart
casebook, is a 1975 law graduate, but he attended law school later in
life than any of the other seven authors, and is older than all of the
authors of Stone. In Part I, below, I address the possible relationship
between authorial experience and intellectual mode suggested by these
two casebooks.
Of course, not all that may be said about these 3000-plus pages will
fit the intergenerational rubric. In Part II of this review, I tum to a
more conventional approach to the task of reviewing casebooks,2 and
reflect on some additional qualities of these two offerings.
I

Having asserted that one can trace a connection between age and
intellectual inclination, I feel compelled to offer several caveats before
engaging in the enterprise. The books being compared in this review
are a first and sixth edition, respectively. There is no doubt a strong
tendency on the part of casebook authors to develop, in their first edition, an approach which becomes the baseline for all subsequent modifications. As a consequence, a comparison between a first and sixth
edition may be misleading. Lockhart, Choper, Kamisar, and Shiffrin
1. All references in this paragraph to age and year oflaw degree attainment are made on the
basis of information provided in AssOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS 1986-87.
2. For reasons that must be obvious to anyone who has ever opened a casebook, reviewing
one (or, what's worse, two) is no simple task. I'm not sure I know what a conventional approach
is, but I do know that I have benefitted from reading Marshall, An Advance in Tradition (Book
Review), 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1508 (1986) (reviewing Stone); Schauer, Book Review, 31 J. LEGAL
ED. 680 (1981) (reviewing G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(10th ed. 1980)); Sedler, Constitutional Law Casebooks: A View from the Podium (Book Review),
79 MICH. L. REV. 1020 (1981) (reviewing seven extant casebooks); Monaghan, Book Review, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1977) (reviewing initial edition of P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSfITUTIONAL DECISONMAKING (1975)); Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1976) (reviewing G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsrITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975)).
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might well write a different book than the one they have produced if
they were to set out today to create a wholly new one.
The second caveat arises from my differential experience with the
two books. I taught a four-hour basic course in constitutional law in
the fall of 1986 using Stone, and focused only on parts of it; although I
once taught from the fifth edition of Lockhart, I have never taught
from the sixth. 3 My comparative familiarity with Stone has no doubt
influenced my perception of the qualities of the two books.
Cursory examination of these works suggests strong similarities between them. Christopher Stone (not the Stone whose casebook is here
under review) pointed out twenty years ago4 that most constitutional
law casebooks follow a fairly set structure, dividing material into large
categories on judicial review, federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights, and, within that structure, dividing material further
into smaller, more clause-bound categories. In these last two decades
only one casebook5 has abandoned this model, and it has achieved
only mixed success. Neither Lockhart nor Stone makes any daring
departure from this conventional structure. 6
The similarities between the books at the level of basic structure
reveal the power of legal categories and suggest that processes of intergenerational transmission have worked most effectively. Despite
their obvious common commitment to these categories, however,
Lockhart and Stone reveal differences of intergenerational import.
These differences include bold matters of intellectual style and more
subtle matters of sequence and priority within the material.
Because sequencing choices can be avoided by teachers using the
book, while intellectual style cannot, the latter seems more significant.
Lockhart is strongly pluralist in orientation. Many of its chapters contain lengthy series of paraphrased or quoted commentary on the
problems under consideration. 7 Unlike recent editions of Professor
3. In my dozen years of teaching constitutional law, in both basic and advanced courses, I
have used casebooks authored or co-authored by Professor Gunther far more than any other. It
would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that I am not steeped in experience in teaching from
either of the books under review.
4. Stone, Towards a General Theory of Constitutional Law Casebooks, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1968).

5. P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (2d ed.
1983).
6. Stone deviates in modest ways, several of which are discussed in Part II infra. Although
Christopher Stone criticized the longstanding conventions as intellectually bankrupt, I do not
share his views. The conventional categories and clause-bound approaches fit the ways in which
judges and lawyers have thought about this material for two centuries. Focusing students on
epistemology, linguistics, see Stone, supra note 4, at 5-12, social history, or what-have-you may
have pedagogical and intellectual value, but those interdisciplinary approaches should at most
supplement conventional approaches, not replace them.
7. The most prominent chapters in this regard include Chapter One, on the "Nature and
Scope of Judicial Review," Chapter Seven on the "Protection of Individual Rights," and Chapter
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Gunther's casebook, 8 which tend to drive the reader toward a particular perspective through the device of rhetorical questions, Lockhart
frequently creates the appearance of agnosticism with respect to particular outcomes and approaches.
The focus of the secondary material on which Lockhart relies similarly suggests the intellectual style of process-oriented pluralists. 9
Doctrinal commentary and history done by constitutional lawyers are
the mainstay of these efforts. It seems to me that this reflects, in large
part, a view of law and constitutional history popular in the 1950s and
1960s but under assault ever since. Two assumptions characterize this
view. The first is that law is a self-contained enterprise, in which
sound decisional processes and careful thought will produce reasoned
and just answers. 10 The second, equally controversial assumption, is
that constitutional history can be relied upon to generate strongly determined answers to many legal inquiries. 11
The pluralist and law-centered qualities of Lockhart are a generational phenomenon. Dean Lockhart came of intellectual age during
the New Deal and its accompanying constitutional revolution. His
generation transmitted to the next one, which reached intellectual maturity between the Second World War and the assassination of President Kennedy, lessons about the danger of judicial activism and
related lessons about the triumph of the pluralist perspective. This
generation of students, which included Choper and Kamisar, thus
learned its constitutional law from teachers who had observed firsthand the death of dual federalism 12 and the temporary restoration of
legislative supremacy. 13 The substantive value-skepticism of Holmes 14
Eight on "Freedom of Expression and Association," but virtually all of the chapters are peppered
with citations and commentaries to diverse secondary sources.
8. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (11th ed. 1985).
9. Dean Choper's other work surely suggests the aptness of this label. See J. CHOPER, JumCIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCESS (1980). The work of Professor Shiffrin,
the new addition to the Lockhart line-up, suggests he may not share those views. See Shiffrin,
Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1103 (1983).
10. This view was at the core of the so-called "Legal Process" school, led in the 1950s by,
inter alia, Herbert Wechsler and Henry Hart. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
In recent years, the idea of law as autonomous has come under withering attack from both
the left, see, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
14-19, 30-38 (1984), and the right, see, e.g., Posner, The Decline ofLaw as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987). Others too have lamented the declining power
of law and legal process as independent ideals. See, e.g., Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. l (1986).
11. For a recent attempt to rehabilitate that view to some extent, see Nelson, History and
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237 (1986). See also Powell, Rules far
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987).
12. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), with Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
13. Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), with Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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and Hand, 15 softened by an abiding faith in methods of and processes
for reasoning about law, constituted the received constitutional faith in
the first two post-war decades, and Lockhart to some extent yet reflects it.
The intellectual style and interdisciplinary leanings of Stone suggest intergenerational changes in scholarly perspective. Compared to
Lockhart, Stone reflects a more complex view of the political process
and a more substantive vision of the possibilities of social and political
life. 16 The former is manifested in the substantial reliance on interest
group theory in the material on the dormant commerce clause (pp.
259-63, 296-97) and the equal protection clause (pp. 535-41); the latter
is suggested by prominent invocation of material, early in the book
and occasionally thereafter, on the republican tradition. 17 This use of
material from history, economics, and political theory is no mere
adornment in the latest academic fashions; 18 at a level of deep intellec14. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he word liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion
•..."). For a recent and intriguing effort at literary criticism of the Holmes dissent in Lochner,
see Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1379-88 (1986).
15. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
16. The prior writings of several of the authors of Stone suggested the possibility that their
casebook might be strongly influenced by the leftist politics and indeterminacy thesis associated
with some members of the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781
(1983); Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime
Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315 (1984). Those fears proved vastly disproportionate to the outcome; no
fair-minded person could detect any strong tendencies in Stone in such directions. The book's
predominant flavors are strongly doctrinal and moderately historical. Nevertheless, there are
ways, explored above, in which the book appears to be responsive to Richard Parker's call for a
constitutional law for his own generation. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory -And Its
Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
17. Stone's first 17 pages are devoted to an exploration of the competing political theories
that surrounded the adoption of the Constitution, including some brief and well-chosen excerpts
from the Federalist papers. This material, if focused upon at the beginning of the course, can
shape much of what comes after. The effort to facilitate student vision of the relationships be·
tween the goals of politics and the structures within which politics occurs seemed to me most
admirable and useful. Later in the book, these concepts are invoked again, commonly in connec·
tion with other work by Professor Sunstein. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitu·
tion, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984), cited in Stone pp. 501, 510, 737, 744, 748, 1435, and 1461.
See also Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP.
CT. REv. 127; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, Foreword: Traces of Se/f Govert1·
ment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
Whether the nee-Republican vision of Sunstein and his collaborators in this book will be
countered by a casebook from the neo-Federalists, see, e.g., Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Dis·
covering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle /IL· Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985); Powell, The Comp/eat Jeffersonian: Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982), remains to be seen. The possibilities seem
intriguing.
18. That this is the case is evidenced by the paucity of attention paid in Stone to the recent
focus on hermeneutics and literary theory in certain quarters of academic constitutional law.
See, e.g., Interpretation Symposium, SSS. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985). My own judgment is in accord
with that implicit in the casebook: interest in economics and political theory will survive among
constitutional scholars long after the interest in literary theory has waned.
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tual structure, the book explores these paths in search of new methods
of analysis and explanation in a field of law which recent theoretical
work has thrown into disarray. Moreover, this reliance on social science and political theory to enrich the constitutional lawyer's vision is
pervasive; it appears in virtually every chapter, and is relied upon in
notes and questions situated in ways which demand attention.
The emphasis in Stone upon the relevance of this nontraditional
material to the solution of legal problems is in tension with the lawcenteredness and faith in legal processes of the preceding generation.
This intellectual phenomenon has a variety of sources. One is the obvious diminution of respect, within and without the legal community,
for legal institutions. The flight from (and by) academic Ph.D.s to the
law schools suggests a socioeconomic explanation; would-be economists and political philosophers appeared on law faculties and began
to make efforts toward bending the law towards their particular academic interests. Alternatively, and in constitutional law in particular,
the disappointment of both right- and left-leaning scholars in their inability to capture the Supreme Court19 in the last fifteen years may
have provoked an increased likelihood of external critique of judicial
work, or an incentive to ignore such work altogether.
Whatever the genesis, the intellectual style of Stone presents perplexing problems of pedagogy. The casebook authors are inescapably
present in the classroom. If the teacher's own intellectual style is at
odds with that of the book, students will have to struggle to reconcile
the competing messages they are receiving.
For example, the emphasis on interest group theory in Chapter
Three of Stone, which focuses on dormant commerce clause problems,
caused me some difficulty. I might have taught with it or against it,
but doing either meant mastering some literature with which I was
only vaguely familiar. Alternatively, I could have chosen to ignore the
theoretical material, leaving the students in doubt and difficulty concerning whether to take it seriously. Ultimately, I moved halfway toward the material, trying in my classroom analysis to include it and
suggest its limits, but not feeling entirely confident in either enterprise.
For teachers not well-versed in this and other nonlegal literature,
Stone will be both a challenge and a rich sourcebook.
At a more general level, the publication of Stone highlights an
ongoing tension in the mission of the law school. I have noticed for
some time an increasing chasm between those of my students with
academic inclinations, who appreciate the tum to theory and interdisciplinary accounts, and the relatively more career-oriented ones, who
19. See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE CoUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V.
Blasi ed. 1983). I have elsewhere reflected on the flight from doctrinal concerns to more theoretical ones. See Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 579 (1983).
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prefer a doctrinal orientation. This gap, I suspect, is mirrored in an
increasingly wide chasm between the more academic law schools and
the bar. The consequences of the growing schism, to which a book
like Stone may call attention, are disturbing for one like myself who
for years has struggled to reconcile an academic view of law with the
practical concerns of those who prepare for practice. Whether the effort to merge doctrine, history, social sciences, and political philosophy in a single casebook exacerbates or alleviates this tension may
depend greatly on the teacher's method of using this book. For one
who has the skill and training to exploit the advantages of the merger,
Stone offers a rare opportunity to try to move the teaching of constitutional law to a new and higher level of the lawyer's art. 20
The other most striking contrast between Lockhart and Stone
emerges from the sequential placement of the material on the Constitution and equality. The intergenerational evolution of the "idea of
Equality" 21 is complex. Brown v. Board of Education 22 burst upon a
country barely ready for the civil rights revolution the case portended.
Three of the four authors of Lockhart had already graduated from law
school when, after years of protests and violence, Congress enacted the
civil rights legislation of 1964. By contrast, three of the four authors
of Stone were teenagers in the early 1960s, and the fourth was in elementary school. For the generation reflected in the authorship of
Stone, the quest for racial justice seemed historically, socially, and politically at the center of the quest for constitutional meaning.23
Generational differences concerning the centrality of egalitarian
themes appear to have shaped the sequencing choices in these books.
Lockhart, perhaps reflecting an older characterization of equal protection as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments," 24 places
that chapter at the very end of its substantive material concerning individual rights. In contrast, Stone introduces the concept of constitutional equality first among the individual rights material in the book.
Material on implied fundamental rights, freedom of expression, the
religion clauses, and state action all come after the equality material.
This mode of organization suggests that equal protection is a first, not
a last, resort of constitutional argument, and transforms the student's
20. Others in the academy have recently called for renewed attention to the relationship
between intellectual life and the art of fine lawyering. See Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
21. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966).
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. My guess is that Supreme Court clerkships with Justice Marshall (Seidman, Sunstein,
and Tushnet) and Justice Brennan (Stone) may have done much to reinforce this perspective.
Moreover, the intergenerational disparity in the authorship of the two casebooks may also have
influenced editorial judgments concerning the relative importance of feminism and its influence
on the development of constitutional law. But see note 37 infra.
24. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.), cited in Lockhart p. 1131.

April-May 1987]

Intergenerationa/ism and Constitutional Law

1397

perspective on what appears thereafter in a variety of ways. 25
First, this sequencing suggests a communal perspective - the subordination of individuated entitlement rights to a sense of the general
good. This message is a subtle one, because the equality chapter raises
frequent questions about the tension between an individual rights focus and a group justice focus for equal protection adjudication. Nevertheless, the idea that individual entitlements might properly be made
to yield to group-oriented remediation is introduced and defended
here (pp. 605-07), and creates a useful backdrop for invocations of the
concept in later material.2 6
Second, the early presentation of the equality material permits a
full development of the perspective that first amendment issues can be
illuminated by equality concerns. Questions concerning speech and
religion, for example, can often be framed in terms of equality, either
in the sense of equal entitlements to speak or practice religion, or the
related sense of limiting censorial discretion on the part of government
officials. By emphasizing equality themes so early, Stone opens up avenues of discussion that a different organization would tend to inhibit.
In particular, this organization permits a close analysis of the relationship between the equal protection clause and the establishment
clause. Adjudication under both clauses utilizes a complex methodology in which government purpose and policy impacts are significant.27
Although the order can of course be reversed, it strikes me as more
sensible to introduce students to the general case of equal protection
before focusing on the more particular case of the equal religious liberty promised by the establishment clause. 28 Moreover, such an approach permits a reasoned and cogent escape from the recently
resurrected originalist view that the establishment clause does no more
25. This systematic separation and prior presentation of equality materials has a cost in
terms of chronological and historical coherence. In particular, the omission of the Slaughterhouse Cases from the student's first look at the substance of the fourteenth amendment troubled
me, and I assigned that case from Chapter Six together with the note on "Reconstruction and
Retreat" in Chapter Five. I think it quite important that the students be exposed early on to the
possible tension between historically-based attention to racial equality and the more questionable
assertions that the fourteenth amendment fastened free-floating notions of natural law upon the
states.
26. The materials in Chapter Seven of Stone on pornography and feminism, pp. 1136-39, and
group defamation, pp. 1082-86, are good examples of comparable tensions in other comers of
constitutional law.
27. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discussing relevance of purpose and
effect in equal protection theory), with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (utilizing concepts of purpose and effect in establishment clause adjudication).
28. For elaboration of the relationship between equal protection and establishment clause
methodology, see Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REv. 739 (1986). For different versions of the relationship, see Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311 (1986); Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality, and Secular Purpose in Establishment Clause Review, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677.
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than forbid government-created preferences among Christian sects. 29
Even if that were once the case, the concept of equal protection operates to generalize the principle of equal religious liberty, covering nonChristian as well as Christian religions, 30 and to fasten the principle
upon the states.
Finally, placing the equal protection materials prior to Roe v.
Wade 31 has significant consequences for teacher and student. Thorough grounding in the equal protection struggle over gender issues,
prior to confronting Roe, affects one's view of the case. Having struggled with whether the Carolene Products 32 footnote reference to "discrete and insular minorities" contemplates women (or men), having
contended with Geduldig 33 and Michael M. 34 and their problematic
emphasis on biological aspects of gender, and having mastered the intricacies of levels of review including the intermediate standard of
Craig v. Boren, 35 students using Stone approach Roe v. Wade with a
rich collection of developed analytical tools and a sense of the Court's
ambivalent attitude toward the liberation of women.
Compare the mind-set towards Roe created by the organization in
Lockhart. If a teacher proceeds directly through the book, she will
begin consideration of individual rights material with the chapter on
"Substantive Protection of Economic Interests." This chapter includes
the trip through Lochner-land, and it leaves an indelible mark in students' minds concerning the (im)propriety of judicial intervention in
defense of unenumerated rights. Chapter Seven, which follows, opens
with the debate on incorporation of the Bill of Rights, in which Justice
Black prevails in both his affirmative campaign to impose Bill of
Rights limitations on the states and his attack on the Lochnerian qualities he associates with the Frankfurter approach. The chapter then
29. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For cogent
responses to this view, see L. LEVY, THE EsrABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1986); Laycock, "Nonpref
erential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875
(1986).
30. Justice Story, on whom Justice Rehnquist relied in his Jajfree dissent, 472 U.S. at 104,
recognized a more limited version of equal religious liberty in the clauses protecting free exercise
and forbidding religious tests for office. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OP
THE UNITED STATES 609 (4th ed. 1873) ("Thus ... the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvin·
ist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table of the national
councils without any inquisition into their faith, or mode of worship.").
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
33. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (concluding that discrimination based on preg·
nancy was distinguishable from discrimination based on gender "as such").
34. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding that distinction between
male and female victims of underage intercourse is justified by capacity of females to become
pregnant).
35. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives" in order to
withstand constitutional attack).
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moves immediately to Griswold and Roe. This placement of Roe
tends, I think, to highlight the arguments for its illegitimacy. Even
though the book is scrupulously fair in its presentation of commentary
for and against Roe, the absence of prior study of gender justice issues
leaves Roe in the unmitigated glare produced by the temporary triumph of Black's brand of interpretivism36 over other, less text-bound
methodologies. 37
I had originally expected to find "evidence" of intergenerational
disagreement about the contours of constitutional law lurking in the
contrasting selection of "major" cases in the two casebooks. 38 In operation, however, this approach primarily revealed strong similarities between the books. To the extent discernible differences appear, they
operate in conflicting directions in time. In some instances, Stone favors older cases that Lockhart does not. For example, one finds fuller
treatment in Stone than in Lockhart of United States v. Butler, 39 Home
Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, 40 and the Civil Rights Cases. 41
In other, significant matters, however, Stone favors more recent
cases than does Lockhart. In the material on the dormant commerce
clause, for example, Stone reduces all of the pre-1970s cases to a series
of long notes and focuses main attention on the major cases of the last
fifteen years, 42 while Lockhart retains a more traditional and historical
focus in its case selection. At the beginning of the section on the rational basis standard in equal protection cases, Stone soundly opts for
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer 43 while Lockhart remains with
Railway Express Agency v. New York 44 Because of its more developed
factual record and its obvious connection with contemporary
36. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusr 2-9 (1980).
37. Reflecting on Roe highlights the all-male character of the authorship of all the existing
constitutional law casebooks of which I am aware. This general state of affairs has not changed
since Professor Sedler called attention to it in his review of seven casebooks some half-dozen
years ago. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 1021 n.2.
38. By "major" cases I mean simply those cases printed at some length and with highlighted
captions, as distinguished from "note" cases, which are given subsidiary treatment.
39. 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 outside the scope of
congressional power to spend for the general welfare). Compare Stone pp. 219-26 with Lockhart
pp. 146-49.
40. 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding Minnesota mortgage moratorium law against Contract
Clause attack). Stone uses Blaisdell as a major case, p. 1430; Lockhart omits it, though it is
discussed in the body of the opinion in the Allied Structural Steel case, pp. 420-26.
41. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that Congress lacks power under the fourteenth amendment
to outlaw race discrimination in privately-owned places of public accommodation). Compare
Stone pp. 1469-74 with Lockhart pp. 1410-13.
42. See Stone pp. 263-312 (focusing on Philadelphia v. New Jersey, Hunt v. Washington Apple
Commn., Exxon v. Board of Governors, and Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways). This choice
seemed entirely explicable as a matter of editing strategy, rather than as the product of a view
that more recent cases are of greater significance.
43. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
44. 336 U.S. 106 (1949). What apparently does not change from one generation to the next is
that - surprise! - rationality analysis begins in New York City.
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problems about the relationship between drug use and employment,
Beazer seems to me to be the more effective vehicle for introducing the
myriad possibilities of equal protection review. At the opening of the
establishment clause material, Stone makes what I found to be the undesirable choice of leading with, and thereby overemphasizing, the disastrous episode of Lynch v. Donnelly. 45 On this matter, my judgment
is to rely, as Lockhart does, upon the germinal case of Everson v.
Board of Education. 4 6
Case selection thus appears to be essentially a matter of editorial
and pedagogical judgment, relatively uninfluenced by the author's position in chronological time. 47 The intergenerational thesis, it turns
out, will only take us so far.
II

The intergenerational thesis is thus radically incomplete in its descriptive or explanatory power. A wide variety of matters independent
of this thesis struck me as worthy of note. Limitations of time and
space forced some arbitrary choices here, and I hope the authors will
forgive and the reader will understand the inevitable randomness and
unevenness with which these comments may fall.
In several places, the editors of each book have made editorial
choices significantly different from those of the other. In the material
on the dormant commerce clause, to start with an example noted earlier, Stone opts for a relatively short note on nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century cases, and a primary focus on a series of decisions
from the past fifteen years. Moreover, this material hangs on an organizational structure which bears a striking resemblance to the structure of equal protection adjudication - facial discrimination,
discriminatory impact, search for forbidden motives, etc. By contrast,
Lockhart adheres to a more traditional format for this material,
presenting it chronologically and dividing it into sections based upon
economic functions (regulation of transportation, trade, migration,
and environmental concerns). Obvious tradeoffs exist between the two
approaches. I found the Stone version vastly easier to teach than any
other casebook's treatment of the material. Nevertheless, in doing so,
45. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1946). Professor Marshall was also bothered by this. See Marshall, supra
note 2, at 1515-16. It should be added that Stone retains a note on Everson at the beginning of
the chapter, p. 1361, and that the questions and notes before and after Lynch work superbly to
put it into context. My reaction to the treatment afforded Lynch is no doubt influenced by my
passionate disagreement with its outcome. See generally Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme
Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall -A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J.
770.
47. There are other concepts of time. See S.J. GOULD, TIME'S ARROW, TIME'S CYCLE
(1987) (distinguishing between chronological and cyclical time).
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I had trouble escaping the feeling that some texture and nuance had
been sacrificed to order and modernity.
A more dramatic contrast of editing strategy arises from the placement of material on fundamental interests associated with the equal
protection clause.48 Lockhart continues to do what books have traditionally done; that is, it places this material within the chapter on
equal protection, after the more "conventional" material on the propriety of various classifications (pp. 1316-402). Stone boldly departs
from this convention by organizing a chapter entitled "Implied Fundamental Rights" (pp. 691-924) which includes economic due process,
interests "fundamental" for equal protection purposes, privacy and familial rights, and a brief section on procedural due process. This separation of equal protection material on the permissibility of classifying
along certain lines (e.g., race or gender) from material on equalitybased substantive interests comports fully with my own analytic approach,4 9 and greatly facilitates exploration of the fundamental interest material. The ready juxtaposition of material on substantive rights
and interests, despite the methodological and jurisprudential differences among them, invites close study of family resemblances and analytic or substantive disparities. Students can be taught to contrast
weak entitlement rights, 50 strong entitlement rights, 51 and strong comparative rights with substantive content52 much more easily when the
materials concerning them are packaged together.
A price is inevitably to be paid for this sort of move, and in Stone
the price is the separation of contract and takings clause material into
a separate and subsequent chapter, entitled "Economic Liberties and
the Constitution" (pp. 1427-65). Because economic due process material already appears in the "Implied Fundamental Rights" chapter, it
obviously cannot be repackaged with the contract and takings clause
material, 53 though it surely comports better with the chapter title
("Economic Liberties") than the material actually contained in the
chapter. A small bit of creative syllabus preparation can solve this
48. Professor Marshall also commented on this aspect of Stone. Marshall, supra note 2, at
1512.
49. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981
(1979).
50. The requirement that governmental decisions be justifiable in terms of instrumental rationality creates entitlement rights, at least in those parties injured by the decision, but these
rights tend to be quite weak because of the deference in the operative review standard. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
51. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Strong comparative rights are generated by those opportunities which government is not
constitutionally obligated to create, but which trigger strong equality claims if the state does
create them. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See generally
Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1985). But see Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
53. Lockhart packages these three topics together in a chapter entitled "Substantive Protection of Economic Interests." Pp. 377-430.
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problem in any number of ways, but its very existence highlights the
obviously second-class qualities of economic rights in current constitutional law. No such rights are implied from the document - I exclude here the protections of the dormant commerce clause, which are
not rights-based - and the explicit protections have been implemented in relatively weak fashion. In this regard, the constitutional
revolution of 1937 has remained unshaken in its outcome.
On occasion, one book presents material on a topic altogether
omitted by the other. Stone has a brief and provocative section on
slavery in the opening of the equality chapter (pp. 435-44). This includes a very short version of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 54 a case that is
fascinating to teach and that sinks the lesson of institutionalized racism into law students better than anything I have ever seen. Students
tend strongly to respect the law and the Supreme Court; reading Chief
Justice Taney's conclusions that masters have federal constitutional
rights of property in their slaves, and that blacks - even blacks free
under state law - are not among "the people of the United States"
who framed the Constitution drives home the overwhelmingly racist
character of American constitutional history and the utterly transforming quality of the post-Civil War Amendments.
Lockhart too has its unique offerings, including a unit on cruel and
unusual punishment, with a near-exclusive focus on the death penalty
(pp. 556-91). This material, frequently ignored in basic constitutional
law courses, creates abundant opportunities for cross-fertilization with
other themes in the course. Among these are the obvious tie-in to issues of equal protection in light of the arguably racial character of
death penalty administration,55 the tension between theories of original intention and the long-standing judicial prescription that the
eighth amendment bars punishments inconsistent with evolving standards of decency, 56 and the role of social science data in constitutional
decisionmaking. 57 Indeed, the death penalty cases are as good as any
in all of constitutional law for illustration of the interplay among facts,
values, and theories of constitutional adjudication.
In the genre of casebooks as chronicles of passing legal fancies,
both books include short notes on the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions. 58 Born of an amalgam of procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection ideas, the doctrine surfaced in
54. 60 U.S. 393 (19 How.) (1857).
55. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of the
death penalty despite statistical evidence showing that those who murder whites are more likely
to be sentenced to death than those who murder nonwhites).
56. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
57. See generally Davis, "There is a Book Out •.. ' ..- An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1987); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Liti·
gation, 1960 SUP. Cr. REV. 75.
58. See Lockhart p. 1402 and Stone p. 921.
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1973s9 and was buried in Weinberger v. Salji 60 in 1975. Working this
through is a wonderful exercise for students; they can usually be made
to see in about twenty minutes what it took the Supreme Court two
years to figure out - that is, that irrebuttable presumptions are simply
bright-line rules about what consequences are to follow from a given
set of facts. Most constitutional law teachers probably ignore these
cases because the doctrine is dead. 61 As the date of its demise recedes
into the past, one would expect this material to move from short section (Lockhart) to short note (Stone) to footnote and ultimately to the
discard file. Because the doctrine has vanished from the law, some
twenty-first century legal historian may well use works such as these
to discover this obscure creature of law that lived and died at the end
of the third quarter of the twentieth century. In casebooks and elsewhere, legal scholars create and preserve legal history.
The free speech chapters in each of these books deserve some focused attention, since both are new. The material here is massive, and
each book does a unique and masterful job of presentation within four
hundred pages. Still, the material is so vast, and linked internally in so
many ways, that I have abandoned any effort to cover freedom of
speech in a basic, four-hour survey course on constitutional law. The
material on freedom of expression demands a course of its own.
What is most striking about these two efforts at organizing speech
and press materials is how difficult a task it appears to be. This seems
so for several reasons. First, methodological perspectives compete
with substantive ones. Focus on prior restraints or the overbreadth
doctrine, for example, will inevitably bump into concerns about obscenity, libel, or national security. 62 Second, the ongoing controversy
about the utility of the concept of content-neutrality63 leads these authors in different directions - Stone relies on the idea of content-neu59. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Vlandis represented a revival, rather than an
original creation. See Soifer, Parental Autonomy, Family Rights and the Illegitimate: A Constitutional Commentary, 7 CONN. L. REv. 1, 37 & n.150 (1974) (tracing the doctrine to several cases,
from the late 1920s and early 1930s, which invalidated state taxes on federal constitutional
grounds).
60. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
61. Skipping this material may have the unfortunate consequence of overlooking the significance of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), a case that belongs, in my
judgment, with Griswold and Roe in the evolution of the now well-entrenched doctrine of procreative choice (the right of"privacy" has always seemed to me a misnomer in describing this line of
cases, and seems all the more so after Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986)). Both Stone,
p. 614, and Lockhart, p. 1296 n.c, mischaracterize LaFleur as an equal protection case.
62. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), for example, raises questions
about prior restraint as a method for suppressing speech, and about national security as a justification for doing so; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) is about statutory overbreadth
as well as the validity of substantive restrictions on political activity by public employees.
63. See, e.g., Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46 (1987); Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); Ely, Flag Desecration, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimi-
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trality as an organizational principle, 64 while Lockhart does not. 65
A more pervasive conceptual dilemma in the law of free speech,
and one which produces strong differences in chapter organization, is
presented by the companion ideas of "unprotected" and "less protected" speech. Lockhart, for example, views New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 66 as creating a standard that separates the protected from the
unprotected (pp. 675-700), while Stone places the defamation material
in a section concerned with "low" value speech (p. 1058). Issues of
obscenity and sexually offensive speech create the most obvious problem in this regard. Stone treats the entire issue under the rubric of
"low" value speech (pp. 1115-69). Lockhart places obscenity in its
own category in a section on "what's protected" (pp. 709-41), returns
to it shortly thereafter in another section on "harm to women and
children," 67 and makes a final pass at the problem in a subpart entitled
the "near obscene" in a section on "less protected speech" (pp. 76776). Stone ultimately "concedes" the organizational difficulties with a
long, final section called "Additional Problems" (pp. 1244-360), including material as disparate as legislative investigations68 and attempts by officials to control intramural speech by public
schoolchildren. 69 Even within this section, struggles for coherent organization continue. In a subpart entitled "Equality and Free Expression," problems as seemingly unrelated as removal of public school
library books70 and subject-focused regulation of picketing71 appear.
These cases are unquestionably about "equality and free expression,"
but so are, inter alia, Cohen v. California, 72 NAACP v. Alabama, 73 Cox
v. Louisiana, 74 and Dennis v. United States. 75 Why these and not
nation, 68 VA. L. REv. 203 (1982); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
64. Pp. 1169-244. Section three ("Symbolic Conduct") and section five ("Litigation and As·
sociation") of this chapter seemed to me ill-fitting with the concept of content-neutrality.
65. Lockhart puts the "public forum" cases - those most generally associated with the idea
of content-neutral regulation - in a section entitled "Government Property and the Public Fo·
rum." Pp. 866-84. This fits well with Professor Shiffrin's general concern, expressed elsewhere,
about the affirmative role of government in the system of free expression, see Shiffrin, Govern·
ment Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980), but operates to exclude from vision cases like Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ordinance prohibiting the emission of "loud and
raucous" noises by amplifiers in the public streets), which arguably fit well the traditional "time,
place, and manner'' formulation associated with the idea of content-neutrality.
66. 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
67. Pp. 754-65. This section, titled in a way that might offend some women (or compliment
some children), sits in a chapter part entitled "new categories,'' and would work better, I think, if
pushed back to the material on "the obscene."
68. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), reprinted in Stone pp. 1316-18.
69. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), reprinted in Stone pp. 1269-70.
70. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), reprinted in Stone pp. 1262-65.
71. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), reprinted in Stone at pp. 1244-46.
72. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
73. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
74. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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those? Lockhart too falls prey to the tendency to create newly minted
but insufficiently bounded categories in a brief section entitled "Closing Channels of Communication" (pp. 907-22), in which it places Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego 76 and Los Angeles City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent. 77 Aren't a great many free speech cases about
government efforts to close some or all channels of communication?
For now, the dilemma of organizing a casebook chapter on freedom of speech appears insoluble. The cross-currents of substance,
methodology, and constitutional perspective must inevitably upset any
plan of organization. The inseparability of content and context aggravate the problem. The competition among overarching theories and
justifications for free speech add a layer of difficulty. In the end, what
amazes about these two chapters is how each in its own way has captured the present situation in free speech law. Whether constitutional
lawyers should be proud of or troubled by this rich complexity is a
question I do not address, although my inclination is to see this dense
difficulty as inevitable.

III
Writing casebooks, and keeping them up to date, has long appeared to me to be a herculean task, and reviewing these two has done
nothing to dispel that impression. The eight scholars whose work I
have been discussing have performed a great service for their professional colleagues. Their careful organization, hard-nosed editing, substantive notes, and rigorous questions guide and provoke us. Their
citations to and thoughtful discussions of a wide variety of primary
and secondary sources frequently influence and surely enhance our
scholarly endeavors. What changes from generation to generation is
intellectual orientation, and judgment on the significance of various
events, legal and otherwise, in the ever-receding past. What does not
change is the inestimable value in the academy and the profession created by good faith effort, focused intelligence, and commitment to an
often underappreciated task.

75. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
76. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
77. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).

